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THE KEYS TO THE KINGDOM:
JUDGES, PRE-HEARING PROCEDURE, AND ACCESS TO
JUSTICE
COLLEEN

F. SHANAHAN*

Judges see themselves as-and many reforming voices urge them to
be-facilitators of access to justice for pro se parties in our state civil and
administrative courts. Judges' roles in pro se access to justice are
inextricably linked with procedures and substantive law, yet our
understanding of this relationship is limited. Do we change the rules,
judicial behavior, or both to help self-represented parties? We have begun
to examine this nuanced question in the courtroom, but we have not
examined it in a potentially more promising context: pre-hearing motions
made outside the courtroom. Outside the courtroom, judges rule on requests
such as motions to continue or for telephone appearances that allow parties
to participate in and access the hearing room. These requests have
significant consequences for the party, do not implicate the merits of the
underlying case, and are a pared-down environment in which to examine
the interaction of judicial behavior and procedures.
This article analyzes pre-hearing procedures using more than 5,000
individual unemployment insurance cases, largely involving self-represented
litigants, to investigate how judges and procedure interact to expand or
contract access to the hearing room and thus to justice. The data show
significant variation in how judges apply these procedures and in parties'
case outcomes. These findings underscore the importance of pre-hearing
procedures and judicial decisions that grant or deny access to the
courtroom, and the barriers that judicial application of these procedures can
present for self-represented litigants. The findings also suggest that changes
to judicial behavior-through suggestion, training, or ethical codes-may be
insufficient to address this aspect of access to civil justice.
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INTRODUCTION

Tens of millions of Americans engage with the civil justice system,
overwhelmingly in state civil and administrative courts.' These courts
are struggling to serve the litigants who seek help through their doors. 2
The core of this challenge is that, despite an adversarial system
designed around the norm of attorneys representing the parties, state
civil and administrative litigants overwhelmingly do not have
representation.'

&

Recent estimates are that there are about twenty million civil non-domestic
1.
cases in the state courts each year. PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, SCOTT GRAVES
SHELLEY SPACEK MILLER, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 16 (2015) [hereinafter NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS].

A 2012-13 survey, capturing about 5% of all state civil cases in the country, found that
64% of these cases were contract matters (of these, 37% were debt collection cases,
29% were landlord tenant matters, 17% were foreclosures), 16% were small claims,
9% were other civil agency determinations, 7% were tort matters, and 1% were
property cases. This data does not count administrative matters. Id. at 16-19. Further,
research shows that courts see only a fraction of legal needs: one study estimates only
24% of civil legal problems were ever taken to a lawyer, and only 14% were taken to a
court. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical
Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51, 56-60 (2010).
NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at iii-vi.
2.
The most recent research shows that in 76% of non-family law cases in
3.
including contract, tort, and property matters, at least one party does
court,
state civil
not have representation. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at iv, 31-32.
Research from the larger study of which this article is a part, among others, has shown
low levels of representation in administrative courts. See, e.g., Colleen F. Shanahan,
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In state civil and administrative courts, the hearing-the in-person
interaction that occurs between self-represented litigants and judges in
the courtroom-is the focal point of the justice system due to two
related factors. First, litigants are largely self-represented and thus have
limited capacity to engage in written pleadings.' As a result, the only
way for litigants to actually participate in state civil and administrative
courts is to come to court in person and talk to the judge. Second, the
procedural rules and substantive law in state civil and administrative
courts are crafted to accommodate this limitation and thus provide
limited opportunities for litigants to engage with state civil courts
outside the hearing. In the face of self-represented litigants who are
unlikely to write motions and briefs, courts may change their
procedures to become more "pro se-friendly" or "simplified" by
emphasizing in-person interaction in the hearing room.
This focus on the hearing as the almost exclusive site of justice
casts judges as the central actors. Thus, the role of judges in the
courtroom is the natural focus of the limited research and reform that
has occurred to date.' Yet, not every litigant gets into the hearing
room. This is because state civil and administrative courts have written
procedures, applied by judges, that control access to the hearing room.
These procedures-such as requests to appear by telephone or for a new
hearing date-are independent of the merits of the underlying case, and
happen in writing (with varying degrees of formality). Due to the
central role of hearings in these cases, these pre-hearing procedures
functionally allow or end a litigant's case.
The judicial gatekeeping role in deciding pre-hearing procedural
motions is largely unseen. The invisibility of these procedures is a
consequence of the inconsistency between the assumption of
representation in our adversarial model and the reality of the civil
justice system. Self-represented litigants, and some types of
representatives, rarely challenge a judge's application of procedure in
Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, 93 DENV.
L. REV. 469 (2016) [hereinafter Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise].
4.

NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at 31-32, 35.

5.
See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market
for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking
the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004); Jessica K. Steinberg,
Adversary Breakdown and JudicialRole Confusion in "Small Case" Civil Justice, 2016
BYU L. REV. 899; Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of
JudicialNeutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when PartiesAppear Pro
Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs
423 (2004).
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the courtroom. 6 Without challenges, our legal system does not allow us
to see what happens in small cases; if there is no objection to overrule
and from which to appeal, we do not know the problem exists.' If this
is true in the hearing room, where the procedure is playing out in plain
view, it is exacerbated in procedures outside the hearing room. A selfrepresented party may submit a form asking for a continuance. That
request is denied. The case ends. Paired with the lack of research, this
invisibility means we do not know the scope of state civil and
administrative court procedures that control access to the hearing room,
or whether they are transparent, predictable, or fair for millions of
litigants.
This article begins to make this part of our justice system visible
by examining extensive empirical data about one example of prehearing procedures that control access to the hearing room. Using data
from over 5,000 unemployment insurance cases, the article looks at
how judges decide motions to continue and motions to appear by
telephone. The findings reveal significant variation among judges in
how they decide these motions and thus control access to the hearing
room for litigants. The data also show that a judge who is more likely
to decide these motions in favor of access to the hearing room
correlates with improved case outcomes for litigants.
Like all empirical studies, the data presented in this article are
from a particular example-in this case, an administrative court and its
collection of judges. This particular example is helpful because motions
to continue and for telephone appearance are common examples of prehearing procedures that exist in thousands of state civil and
administrative courts around the country. In addition, as discussed in
more detail below, the data are from a court that is generally friendly to
self-represented litigants. As a result, the challenges revealed by this
study are likely to be experienced in more extreme forms in courts with
fewer resources and less investment in access for self-represented
litigants.
Part I of the article discusses the scholarly context for this article.
Part II describes the site of the study, the data, and the methodology.
Part III presents the findings. Part IV discusses the implications of these
findings.

See, e.g., Anna E. Carpenter, Alyx Mark & Colleen F. Shanahan, Trial
6.
and Error: Lawyers and Nonlawyer Advocates, 42 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1023 (2017)
[hereinafter Trial and Error].
Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little
7.
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGs L.J. 1367, 1373 (2016)
[hereinafter Can a Little Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?].
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I. CONTEXT

Scholars have only begun to research and understand the
challenges facing state civil and administrative courts.! Most of this
scholarship examines questions of representation, driven by the stark
difference between the impossibility of a lawyer for each litigant in
state court and the theoretical norm (and general reality in the federal
system) of two represented parties in an adversarial system.9 As a
result, state civil and administrative courts and their lack of resourcesespecially representation-have earned them the moniker "poor
people's courts." 10 The literature has begun to theorize about the role of
representation, observe the variation in how state civil courts operate,
evaluate the role of representation in these systems, and expand
empirical examination of these questions." In addition, there is
8.
Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical
Study of Access to Justice, 2013 Wis. L. REv. 101. See also Can a Little Representation
Be a Dangerous Thing?, supra note 7; D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does
Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012); Lawyers,
Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3; Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local
Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 707 (2015); Shannon Portillo, The
Adversarial Process of Administrative Claims: The Process of Unemployment Insurance
Hearings, 49 ADmIN. & Soc'Y 257 (2017) (describing a sociological study of the
District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings); Mary Spector & Ann
Baddour, Collection Texas-Style: An Analysis of Consumer Collection Practicesin and
out of the Courts, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1427 (2016); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side
Reform in the Poor People's Court, 47 CONN. L. REv. 741 (2015); Trial and Error,
supra note 6. Two early seminal studies of state courts were HERBERT M. KRITZER,
LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998) and Barbara Bezdek,

Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal
Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533 (1992).
9.
Lawyers, Power and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3. See also Richard
Zorza, We Now Have the Data that Shows that the One-Side-Self-Represented Case is
the Dominant Case Situation in US Civil State Courts and that We Need a Fundamental
Rethink of the State Civil Justice System, AcCESS TO J. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/5P3H-B23L].
10.
Russell Engler coined the term some years ago, and the recent increase in
scholarship concerning civil access to justice has resurrected it. Russell Engler, Out of
Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with
UnrepresentedPoor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 79, 83 (1997). See, e.g., Elizabeth L.
MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People's Courts, 22 GEo. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 473, 476 (2015); Steinberg, supra note 8.
11.
As empiricism has grown in legal scholarship, there is an increasing focus
on research that looks at the civil justice system in the lower courts and in the lives of
most Americans. One strain of this scholarship labels itself as access to justice
scholarship. See, e.g., Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 8; MacDowell, supra note 10;
Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of
Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 453, 456-58 (2011).
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increasing awareness of the complementary and prevalent role of
administrative courts along with state civil courts in our legal system.12
The overwhelming conclusion of existing research is that these
courts are not working. They are not working for litigants looking for
effective problem solving mechanisms," for an experience of justice or
satisfaction in their interactions with the system,' 4 or for avoiding
negative social or economic consequences from legal problems." This
is especially true for less-resourced litigants in cases with asymmetrical
power relationships." The courts are not working for low or no cost
legal service providers who are overwhelmed by demand and under
resourced." They are not working for court systems, either from a

&

Other voices come from new legal realism. See e.g., Howard Erlanger, Bryant Garth,
Jane Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse & David Wilkins, Is it Time for a New
Legal Realism?, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 335, 337; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer,
Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal
Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 79 (2009). The scholarly literature is complemented
by efforts of state court actors to understand the realities and potential in the existing
system. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS OF Low-iNcoME AMERICANs (2017); NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note
1.
Judith Resnik, Reinventing Courts as Democratic Institutions, 143
12.
DAEDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & Sci. 9 (2014). See also Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica
K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the "New" Civil Judges,
2018 Wis. L. REV. 249.
Jonathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in
13.
Felony Cases, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 483, 485-87, 499-500 (1988); William M.
O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small
Claims Court Narratives, 19 L. & Soc'Y REV. 661, 661-62, 666-67 (1985).
Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the
14.
Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & Soc'y REV.
645 (2008); E. Allan Lind, et. al, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
953 (1990); William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the Civil
Justice System, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 137 (1988); Victor D. Quintanilla, Taboo
Procedural Tradeoffs: Examining How the Public Experiences Tradeoffs Between
ProceduralJustice and Cost, 15 NEV. L.J. 882 (2015); Tom R. Tyler, Justice and
Power in Civil Dispute Processing, in JUSTICE AND POWER INSOCIOLEGAL STUDIES
(Bryant G. Garth, Austin Sarat eds., 1998) (providing overview of empirical studies
about litigant satisfaction, viewed subjectively); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures,22 L.
Soc'Y REV. 103 (1988); Nourit Zimerman & Tom. R. Tyler, Between Access to
Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
473 (2010) (party participation leads to voluntary compliance with governmental
decisions).
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 11, at 7 (seven in ten low-income
15.
Americans report that a legal problem has significantly affected their lives).
Lawyers, Power, & Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 484-89.
16.
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 11, at 37-45.
17.
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system design perspective or as an exercise in public spending. In the
face of the reality that lawyers cannot assist litigants as the adversarial
system presumes, scholars and advocates have begun to develop new
norms and designs for state civil and administrative justice systems.
One strain of this scholarship casts judges as key actors in facilitating
access to justice in state civil courts.18
Federal civil judges have long captured the attention of the
scholarly community, and this literature is far more developed than
research about state civil or administrative judges.19 This research has
largely focused on the role of judges inside the courtroom, or in
deciding dispositive pretrial motions such as motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment." The scholars who have considered judges as
procedural gatekeepers outside the courtroom have almost exclusively

18.
Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (andfor Pro Se Court Reform),
62 FLA. L. REV. 1227 (2010); Engler, supra note 5; Pearce, supra note 5; Steinberg,
supra note 8. In addition to the judge-focused thinking discussed in this article, there
are other approaches such as those focusing on clerk and self-help centers. Deborah L.
Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 869, 899-901
(2009); Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to
Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
45, 60-61 (2012) (noting self-help reforms and court simplification efforts "have
become significant features of the access-to-justice landscape in their own right").
Another strain of this literature focuses on technology and design, driven in part by the
role of technology in current society and perhaps also by commercial interests in
technological solutions. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANos BIBAS, REBOOTING
JUSTICE: MORE TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW (2017);
Margaret Hagan, The User Experience of the Internet as a Legal Help Service: Defining
Standardsfor the Next Generation of User-Friendly Online Legal Services, 20 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 394 (2016).
19.
This is unsurprising. We write what we know and lots of us know federal
courts and federal judges. In addition, access to empirical data is far easier in the
federal courts. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL
CHOICE 65-85 (2013) (discussing political affiliation and judicial decision making);
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the
Assumption that Judges Behave Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 21, 25
(1931); Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having
Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 38
(2015) (discussing gender of judge's children & votes on gender issues); Andrew J.
Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow
the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEx. L. REV. 855 (2015); Corey Rayburn Yung,
A ypology of Judging Styles, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1757 (2013).
20.
EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 65-85; Frank, supra note
19, at 21-25; Glynn & Sen, supra note 19, at 38; Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie,
supra note 19; Yung, supra note 19.
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considered the role of federal judges in discovery in complex
litigation. 2
At best, this literature is a distant analogy for state civil or
administrative judges.22 This is because in federal and complex
litigation, attorney representation for both parties is more consistently
present. 23 This representation shapes (and checks) judicial behavior in
ways that define the judicial role. In addition, federal procedureresting on the assumption of attorney representation-provides for
meaningful process outside the courtroom. 24 A simple example
illustrates the difference: in federal court, a lawyer may request a
rescheduled hearing date because the party has a medical condition.
Even if that request is denied, the party has not lost her chance to
pursue her case. Rather, the attorney would go without the party, or the
attorney would file a motion for summary judgment that resolves the
case, or any other collection of procedural adjustments. A default
ruling against the party would be highly unusual. Without this
representation or procedure in state civil courts, both the context and
the judicial role are different: if the request for continuance is denied,
the party is without recourse in practice and her case would end.
As my co-authors and I explain in more detail in Studying the
"New" Civil Judges, there is a glaring need for research about state
civil and administrative courts and judges.25 It is unsurprising that the
limited research that does exist examines the role of judges in the

E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53
21.
U. Cm. L. REv. 306 (1986); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1247-50 (2005); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural
Checks on Power in the Era of ManagerialJudging, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 41 (1995);
Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 378-80 (1982). But see Paul
R.J. Connolly, Why We Do Need Managerial Judges, JUDGES' J., Fall 1984, at 34
(arguing in favor of managerial judging). See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (describing the rise of
public law litigation in the federal courts and the role of judges in this context).
It is worth noting that even in complex federal litigation, the managerial
22.
judge has been criticized, criticism that is magnified in the state civil court context. See,
e.g., 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 55
(1990) (criticizing arbitrariness of judicial discretion in "managerial" decisions).
Federal courts are not completely immune to the challenges of self23.
represented litigants, as reflected in Judge Posner's recent attention to how selfrepresented litigants are treated in federal appeals (which are largely appeals from
administrative matters). See Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner,
JudicialProvocateur, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), [https://perma.cc/G6LH-LZUQ].
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16; Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial
24.
in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 347, 395 (2003).
Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 12.
25.
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hearing room-what is the judge doing, how, why, and could the judge
behave differently so that the civil justice system operates more
effectively?26 The handful of studies that have considered judicial
behavior outside the hearing room have done so in circumstances that
are not squarely in state administrative or civil courts.27
This article uses as its foundation the research we do have about
state civil and administrative courts and the role of judges, and the
limited analogy of research about federal judges. With this foundation,
the article makes visible the decision-making of judges in pre-hearing
procedural requests. Without the layers of interpersonal interaction that
occur in the hearing room, this is a low "noise" way to consider
questions of judicial decision-making. 28 The article addresses a narrow
set of questions about these pre-hearing procedures, and this analysis
provides insight into larger questions of access to justice in state civil
and administrative courts.

26.
JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, MEETING THE
CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT
MANAGERS 54 (1998);

Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and
Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533
(1992) (empirical study of a Baltimore housing court); Anna E. Carpenter, Active
Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 647 (2017) [hereinafter Active
Judging and Access to Justice] (developing theories of judicial behavior in the
administrative hearing room that underpin "active judging"); Michele Cotton, A Case
Study on Access to Justice and How to Improve It, 16 J.L. Soc'Y 61 (2014) (study
examining the experiences of unrepresented tenants in a landlord/tenant court); Jessica
K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a ProblemSolving Housing Court, 42 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1058 (2017); Steinberg, supra note 8, at
788 (discussing "dismantling barriers put in place by procedural and evidentiary rules"
and "narrow conceptions of the judicial role"); id. at 747 (a reformed system is one
where "disclosure of key documents is automatic, the rules of evidence emphasize
weight rather than admissibility, and judges assume an active role in identifying legal
theories and drawing out relevant testimony").
27.
See John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Fundamentals of
Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66
N.C. L. REv. 467, 467-68 (1988); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372-73 (2007) (discussing
immigration adjudication in federal setting).
28.
Robert P. Bums, The Rule of Law in the Trial Court, 56 DEPAUL L. REv.
307, 319-20 (2007) (suggesting that legal rules may be applied more accurately in
motions than in trials, in part because exposure to extraneous factors is less likely);
Morton Denlow, Justice Should Emphasize People, Not Paper, 83 JUDICATURE 50, 50
(1999) (arguing that the lack of face-to-face interaction among parties, judges, and
lawyers is detrimental to the federal justice system); Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie,
supra note 19, at 899 (demonstrating "that affect influences law interpretation and
application and that it does so even in the relatively emotionally arid (compared to trial)
setting of pretrial motions").
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II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Like all empirical studies, the data in this article describe only the
court and the cases being studied. Yet the characteristics of this study
site are not unusual. State courts are the courts closest to the people and
they hear the largest number of cases in the country. Administrative
29
courts are increasingly formal and central to people's lives.
Administrative courts exist in every jurisdiction, with significant case
volume and limited representation, and handle issues such as housing
disputes, Social Security, Medicare, unemployment and other benefits,
school discipline, and family law issues.3 Though there is variation of
all kinds at the state and local levels, there are also shared
characteristics, including the hearing as the centerpiece of the process
and limited discovery or merits consideration outside the hearing
room.

31

A. Data and Site of the Study
This article draws on data including more than 5,000 individual
unemployment insurance cases with information on every part of the
case.32 The data capture the entirety of the court's docket-all of the
cases that were filed-for two and a half years. The data also include
qualitative interviews with representatives and judges who try and hear
these cases.33 The study is informed by the author and co-investigator's
experiences representing clients in these cases.'
Paris R. Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the AL! in
29.
Assisting the Pro Se Litigant, 27 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447, 455-56
(2007); Phyllis E. Bernard, The AdministrativeLaw Judge as Bridge Between Law and
Culture, 23 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 9-12, 18 (2003) (describing Social
Security administrative law judges behaving like civil trial judges and noting, "[in
many agencies today, administrative litigation is virtually indistinguishable from civil
litigation").
Bernard, supra note 29, at 25-28.
30.
See Baldacci, supra note 29, at 455-56, 486.
31.
To collect the quantitative data, my co-researchers, research assistants,
32.
and I engaged in a three-step process. First, we obtained data from Office of
Administrative Hearings' case management system. Second, we supplemented and
verified this data through review of each paper case file, conducted according to a
comprehensive collection protocol. Third, we performed supplemental two-tier data
checks of the paper case files and reviewed the collected data for both internal
consistency and consistency with court procedures. The collected data were then coded
according to a comprehensive coding plan to allow for the use of statistical software for
analysis.
The qualitative data are presented in this article only when relevant to the
33.
quantitative analysis. For more on the qualitative data, see Colleen F. Shanahan,

2018:215

The Keys to the Kingdom

225

These cases are unemployment insurance appeals in the District of
Columbia's central administrative court, the Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH). OAH is an independent organization, which began
formal operation in 2004 to improve hearings arising from District
agencies. 35 Unemployment insurance appeals, the focus of our data, are
one of about a dozen types of cases heard at OAH.36 Appointed
administrative law judges (ALJs) hear these cases, to which they are
randomly assigned."
On one side of an unemployment insurance appeal is a worker who
has been separated from her job and is seeking unemployment benefits.
On the other side of the appeal is the worker's former employer, whose
incentive to contest benefits is a tax rate that corresponds to the number
of former workers who have received unemployment benefits.38
Employers include a wide range of small and large corporations and
government agencies. Workers in these cases disproportionately held
low-wage jobs.39
Though the opposing parties are the worker and employer, this is
an administrative proceeding that arises from the Department of
Employment Services' decision about the worker's qualification for
benefits. As a result, these cases do not have the typical settlement rate
of other "small" civil cases. To the contrary, an employer does not
Jeffrey Selbin, Alyx Mark & Anna E. Carpenter, Measuring Law School Clinics, 92
TUL. L. REV. 547 (2018); Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 26; Trial
and Error, supra note 6.
34.
We did not formally collect data by observing hearings, though the
combination of my five years and Professor Carpenter's two years of experience
supervising student representation in the same clinic exposed us to hundreds of these
cases between 2010 and 2015.
35.
About OAH, OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, [https://perma.cc/BR2RCL8Y].
36.
Id.
37.
ALJs are appointed by the Commission on Selection and Tenure (COST),
ultimately for six-year terms. See D.C. CODE § 2-1831.08(c) (2017). COST consists of
one member appointed by the Mayor, one member appointed by the Chairman of the
D.C. Council, one member appointed by the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia, and two non-voting members appointed by the Office of the
Attorney General and the Chief AU. Id. §2-1831.07(a). The ALJs come from a range
of professional and personal backgrounds. ALJ Biographies, OFFICE OF ADMIN.
HEARINGS, [https://perma.cc/9RJZ-QCMF].
38.
D.C. CODE §51-103 (2015).
39.
See AusTIN NICHOLS & MARGARET SIMMs, URBAN INST., RACIAL AND
ETHNIc DIFFERENCES IN RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS DURING THE

GREAT

RECESSION
(2012),
[https://perma.cclG9BQ-69DZ]; U.S.
Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-0701147, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: LoW-WAGE
AND PART-TIME WORKERS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE Low RATES OF RECEIPT (2007),

[https://perma.cc/CBC7-SXE8].
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have the ability to settle a case because the employer does not control
the award of benefits; rather, the employer only contests the facts
regarding separation from employment.
B. Centrality of the Hearing
These cases are good opportunities to observe how judges
implement pre-hearing procedures because the hearing is the
substantive centerpiece of the litigation. There is a strong emphasis of a
resolution on the merits in the hearing room. Consistent with due
process principles, the procedural rules at OAH accommodate selfrepresented parties with limited capacity for substantive motions
practice outside the hearing room.40 Unemployment insurance appeals
at OAH are de novo hearings, where the underlying agency
determination has no legal weight and the agency record (other than the
agency determination letter) is not introduced into evidence or even
made available to the parties. Discovery procedures are limited, and
rarely used, save for a rule that requires the parties to share exhibits
and witnesses three days before the hearing.4 1 In addition, the employer
in these hearings bears the burdens of production and of proof. In
practice, this means that if an employer does not appear at their hearing
and the worker appears, the worker wins. Thus, pre-hearing requests
are particularly important because these requests are necessarily about
participating at all in one's case.
Further, in the District of Columbia, there is explicit appellate
authority for a "'strong judicial and societal preference' for the
42
resolution of disputes on their merits rather than by default," a
preference that necessarily requires activity in the hearing room due to
the procedural rules in these cases. Appellate law further provides that
"resort to technicalities to foreclose recourse to . . . judicial processes
is 'particularly inappropriate'" in unemployment and other statutory

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) ("[tlhe opportunity
40.
to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard.").
D.C. OAH Rule 2985.1 (2016). In practice, a failure to disclose does not
41.
use of this evidence. Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note
prevent
always
26, at 678, 687-88.
Moore Energy Res., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Conm'n, 785 A.2d 300, 305
42.
(D.C. 2001) (quoting Abell v. Wang, 697 A.2d 796, 800 (D.C. 1997)).
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schemes "in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the
process.""
Proceedings at OAH look and feel similar to a court of general
jurisdiction, in contrast to administrative proceedings in some other
contexts." Judges hear cases in formal hearing rooms with a dais,
witness box, gallery, and audio equipment. The judges wear robes,
have gavels, and the parties sit at separate "counsel" tables. The
process of these hearings is also formal, including objections, motions,
and introducing documents. Every case results in a written decision.
Our earlier articles have explored how procedures play an important
role in these cases, and that self-represented parties are less likely to
use procedures than represented parties.4
A majority of parties in the data have no representation, and
workers are more likely to be unrepresented. Neither party has
representation in forty-nine percent of these cases, with workers going
without representation in eighty-two percent of cases and unrepresented
employers in fifty-eight percent of cases.' In almost ninety percent of
the cases in the data, at least one party does not have representation.4
OAH has a variety of legal representation for those who are
represented. Most represented workers are served by law school
clinics, the pro bono Claimant Advocacy Program, or the Legal Aid
Society of D.C. 48 Represented employers are served by nonlawyers
working with human resources companies, in-house counsel, private
attorneys, or the pro bono Employer Advocacy Program.49

Barnett v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C. 1985)
43.
(quoting Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); Id. (quoting Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972)).
44.
See Nina Schuyler, The Challenges and Rewards of an Administrative Law
Judge, S.F. ATT'Y, Spring 2010, at 39, 40-41. Unemployment appeal hearings in some
states are held by telephone or in meeting rooms. See, e.g., MICH. UNEMP'T INS.
AGENCY, A GUIDE TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS HEARING 7, 11-13,

15,

[https://perma.cc/J4S4-B3Q8] (discussing hearings being held either in person in a
hearing room or by telephone).
45.
Can a Little Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, supra note 7, at
1375-76; Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 470.
46.
Trial and Error, supra note 6, at 1032.
47.
Shanahan, Selbin, Mark & Carpenter, supra note 33, at 17.
48.
Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 476; Shanahan,
Selbin, Mark & Carpenter, supra note 33, at 18.
49.
Trial and Error, supra note 6, at 1032-33.
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C. The District of Columbia:A Pro Se-Friendly Jurisdiction

The District of Columbia is a relatively pro se-friendly
jurisdiction. The potential contrast with other jurisdictions makes the
data particularly important: if this is the experience of parties in a pro
se-friendly jurisdiction, what is the experience of unrepresented parties
in less friendly jurisdictions? Any findings from this data that suggest
restricted or difficult access to the hearing room are the "better"
version of this access to justice challenge. It is a reasonable hypothesis
that these problems are worse elsewhere.
The pro se-friendliness of the District of Columbia arises in the
data in several ways. First, data collection for this study occurred just
after the District of Columbia completed an effort to examine the role
of judges in facilitating pro se access. This effort resulted in an
expansion-as captured in both formal rules of conduct and informal
training and guidance-of the understanding of how judges could assist
self-represented parties in hearings.s
Second, even before this effort in the District of Columbia, OAH
had formal rules and informal practices that accommodated selfrepresented parties. This is in part a reflection of the nature of
administrative law, with its more flexible rules of evidence and
standards of review. It is also in part a reflection of the relatively
unusual phenomenon in the District of Columbia of a centralized,
professionalized court to hear administrative cases. It is also a
consequence of the D.C. Court of Appeals' active role in requiring pro
se friendliness in administrative matters, and the effect of this appellate
activity on the judges at OAH."
Third, the substantive law governing unemployment insurance
appeals is claimant (worker) friendly, and workers are the more likely
pro se, and typically less-resourced party. 5 2 Federal and District law
clearly establishes "[u]nemployment benefits 'are a matter of statutory

50.
For a summary of D.C. court reform, see District of Columbia Courts,
DC AcCESS TO JUSTICE COMM'N, [https://perma.cc/2PF6-VB2N]. See Active Judging
and Access to Justice, supra note 26.
Prime v. D.C. Dep't. of Pub. Works, 955 A.2d 178, 185 (2008). The
51.
court stated:
We have repeatedly held, in applying statutory regimens in which litigants
ordinarily represent themselves, that a measure of leniency is appropriate
with respect to procedural or other similar errors or miscues, that the
contentions of the pro se litigants are to be generously construed, and that
waivers of substantive claims or defenses are not to be lightly inferred.
See also Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 26.
52.
Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3.
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entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."'53 The D.C. Court
of Appeals has actively enforced its holding that the unemployment
compensation statute "should be construed liberally, whenever
appropriate to accomplish the legislative objective of minimizing the
economic burden of unemployment." 54 As a result of this overlap of
substantive law, procedures, and judicial conduct reform, the data in
this article capture a pro se-friendly version of how pre-hearing
procedures control access to the hearing room.
D. Pre-HearingProcedures
In unemployment insurance appeals at OAH, parties can make prehearing and post-hearing requests." These requests must be in writing,
but the court accepts almost any form of writing, so the submissions
range from formal motions written by lawyers to handwritten letters
from workers. If a party attempts to make a request by telephone or in
person, the clerk tells the person to submit the request in writing by
mail, fax, email, or in person. The court's website has simple forms for
basic requests.56 OAH has a resource center directly next to the clerk's
desk where parties can get assistance completing these forms or
otherwise submitting written requests.
This article examines the two most common pre-hearing
procedural requests: requests to appear by telephone and requests for a
different hearing date. When judges consider these pre-hearing
requests, they typically have only the request to consider. There are no
discovery motions, pretrial merits motions, pretrial hearings, settlement
conferences, or any other information or interaction that can form an
impression about the case like there is in federal or complex civil
litigation. In this data, the judge has little to no information about the
substantive claims in the case when considering the pre-hearing
procedural requests. The judge can see the caption in the case, which
indicates whether it is the worker or employer who has filed the appeal,

53.
Hawkins v. Dist. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 381 A.2d 619, 623 (D.C.
1977); see D.C. CODE § 51-110(a) (2015).
54.
Bublis v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 575 A.2d 301, 303 (D.C. 1990).
55.
Though this article focuses on pre-hearing requests, there are also posthearing requests such as a motion for new hearing or motion for reconsideration that
ask a judge either to schedule a new hearing when the party has missed a court date or
to change her decision based on new evidence. Because the written law of post-hearing
requests combines both procedural access and the merits of the underlying case, these
requests are not part of this article's analysis.
56.
OAH Forms, OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, [https://perma.cclEUJ962QP].
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and thus who lost the agency determination. Though it is not evidence
in the case or legally binding in any way, the judge may be able to
access a paper case file with a one-page agency determination letter that
typically has a few sentences about the reason for a decision. However,
our qualitative research shows that it is rare for a judge to have the case
file far enough in advance of a hearing to have read it while considering
a pre-hearing request."
Specific OAH rules and practices, as well as appellate law, govern
these requests. Telephone appearances are explicitly provided for in
OAH's procedural rules and are permitted "for good cause shown" and
"will ordinarily be granted where the witness does not reside [in the
area]."" There is not a specific OAH Rule governing rescheduled
hearing dates in unemployment insurance cases." As a matter of
practice, a "good cause" standard is also applied to these requests. The
standard appears routinely in the written decisions in these cases when
reciting a procedural history where a continuance was grantedi 0 In
addition, written decisions where one party does not appear note the
absence of a continuance or telephone request in explaining why the
court proceeded in the party's absence. 6
The D.C. Court of Appeals, while not directly addressing prehearing continuance or telephone requests in unemployment cases, has
considered pre-hearing continuances in other administrative matters and
This understanding is based on qualitative interviews with judges and
57.
representatives that were part of the broader study. It is consistent with the author's
experience directing a clinic that represented hundreds of workers in these cases. See
Active Judging andAccess to Justice, supra note 26.
58.
D.C. OAH Rule 2821.8 (2016). Telephone appearances may be the one
area where D.C. is less pro se-friendly than other states: in many states, unemployment
compensation hearings are exclusively telephone hearings. Andrew Grosjean,
Preparing for an Unemployment Hearing or Telephone Conference, TOUGHNICKEL
(Aug. 17, 2016), [https://perma.cc/J4YL-SV9K] (stating that "most [u]nemployment
hearings are done by phone").
There is a "good cause" standard for other specific types of cases. There
59.
is a specific rule allowing for extension of time to file an initial unemployment appeal
for "excusable neglect or good cause." D.C. OAH Rule 2981.1 (2016). There are also
specific rules for school discipline and failure to attend a public benefits hearing. D.C.
OAH Rule 2902.8 (2016) (school discipline); D.C. OAH Rule 2976.2 (2016) (failure to
attend public benefits hearing).
See, e.g., M.L.B. v. Employer, No. 2010 DCOAH 00446, 2010 WL
60.
2168924, at *1 (D.C. Office of Admin. Hearings March 23, 2010) ("On March 15,
2010, for good cause shown, I granted Employer's request for a continuance and
rescheduled the hearing . . .").
61.
See, e.g., U.H.C. v. K.W, No. 2007 DCOAH 109180, 2008 WL
2953173, at *1 n.1 (D.C. Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 30, 2008) ("Claimant failed
to appear for the January 25, 2008 hearing. . . . Claimant did not file a request for
continuance or otherwise explain an inability to appear for the hearing.").
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taken a generous stance despite the high abuse of discretion standard to
which administrative agencies are held.6 2 On appellate review, the court
considers "the reasons for the request for continuance, the prejudice
that would result from its denial, the parties['] diligence in seeking
relief, any lack of good faith, and any prejudice to the opposing
party." 6 3 In addition, the Court of Appeals applied a "good cause"
standard to an unemployment case where the continuance request was
made at the hearing itself."
Taken as a whole, the formal law and practices that are the context
for the data in this article are such that pre-hearing motions to continue
and for telephone appearances can be considered similar requests for
access to the hearing room, using a similar legal standard, in a legal
regime where the hearing room is the centerpiece, and the law both
allows for and, in some ways, encourages judges to grant such requests
for access.
1.

MATERIALS FOR LITIGANTS

In addition to formal procedures, OAH provides materials to the
public about continuances and telephone hearings.6 Each party receives
a scheduling order that includes a hearing date, information about pro
bono attorney services, and information about continuances and
telephone hearings. The scheduling order provides this information
regarding telephone hearings (which is then followed by instructions
about filing the request and service on the other party): "Participation
by Telephone: You may ask to participate by telephone, if you have a
good reason. You may also ask that a witness participate by telephone,
if there is a good reason." 66

62.
"The denial of a continuance will be reversed when a continuance is
needed 'to avoid "material hardship and injustice.""' Murphy v. A.A. Beiro Constr.
Co., 679 A.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Feaster v. Feaster, 359
A.2d 272, 273 (D.C. 1976) (quoting Etty v. Middleton, 62 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C.
1948)); see also PUB. ADN. LAw & PROCEDURE § 137 (73A CoRPus JURIS
SECUNDUM 1983) ("[T]he refusal by an administrative agency to grant a continuance of
a hearing clearly required by the ends of justice is an abuse of discretion.").
63.
A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 679 A.2d at 1043.
64.
Nursing Unlimited Serys., Inc. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 974 A.2d
218, 220 (D.C. 2009).
65.
As with many courts, these publicly available materials and orders evolve
regularly. The materials described here were available during the time period captured
by the data in this article.
66.
D.C. Office of Admin. Hearings, Scheduling Order for an In-Person
Hearing, at 2 (on file with author).
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It provides this information regarding a new hearing date:
"Changing Hearing Date or Time: We discourage this because we want
to resolve your case quickly. If you have a good reason for making
such a request, you must first try to contact the other party and see if
they will agree." 67
In addition, OAH provides standardized request forms on its
website and at the resource center. The Telephone Form states, "[y]ou
or your witness may participate by telephone at your hearing . . . if you
have a good reason. You must try to get the other party to agree.""
The Different Hearing Date Form states "[y]ou may ask for a different
hearing date or time if you have an emergency or another good reason.
You must try to get the other party to agree."69
OAH also publishes (online and at the resource center) two "What
to Expect at a Hearing" booklets: a general one and an unemployment
insurance specific one. The unemployment insurance booklet says that
parties "may submit evidence to OAH in the form of in person or
telephonic sworn testimony by themselves or other witnesses and/or
documents or other exhibits" but includes no instructions or standards
for telephone hearings or continuances." The general booklet has
language that sets a high bar for these requests. 7 Regarding telephone
hearings, the booklet states:
In rare circumstances you may file a written Motion to
Appear by Telephone at your hearing. OAH generally doesn't
allow telephone hearings because it puts the person on the
telephone (and the parties and judge in the courtroom) at a
disadvantage. You must show that coming to the hearing in
person is a true hardship in order to be allowed to appear by
phone."
Regarding continuances, the booklet states:

Id.
General-Request to Participate by Telephone - English, OFFICE OF
ADMIN. HEARINGS, [https://perma.cc/D556-YKT8].
69.
General-Request for a Different Heating Date - English, OFFICE OF
67.
68.

ADMIN. HEARINGS,

70.

[https://perma.cc/2BG9-XFJT].

OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, WHAT TO EXPECT AT AN UNEMPLOYMENT

INSURANCE HEARING, [https://perma.cc/NA88-U5N3].
OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, WHAT TO EXPECT AT A HEARING
71.

[https://perma.cc/X2LE-CGJ5].
72.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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You must attend the hearing in person. If you don't, you
could lose your case. In rare circumstances, such as scheduled
surgery or a hearing in another court, you can request a new
hearing by filing a written Motion for a Continuance. You
must ask for a continuance as soon as you know about the
conflict. OAH won't normally postpone a hearing for
personal reasons or business appointments. Judges also
usually won't accept last minute Motions for Continuance,
unless you have an unforeseen, serious conflict outside of
73
your control, such as a medical emergency.
These materials for litigants are interpretations (and perhaps
modifications) of the formal procedures and appellate law in the
District, and in some ways are inconsistent among themselves. The data
in this article do not provide the ability to separate the formal law from
the informal information provided to litigants. What can be said is that
litigants are making these pre-hearing requests in the face of informal
information that is at least as stringent as the formal law."
E. Methodology
The quantitative analysis in this article begins with the hypothesis
that there is variation among judges in how frequently they grant
continuances or telephone hearings. After observing variation in each
kind of request, I hypothesize that this variation might matter in some
way to the rest of litigants' case experiences.
To explore this hypothesis, I develop the theory of accessfriendliness. Access-friendliness observes a judge's likelihood of
granting each type of pre-hearing request. It captures the collection of
individual preferences and exercises of discretion in applying the law
that result in a judge's decisions, so that this characteristic can be
observed relative to other data about these cases." A judicial accessfriendliness scale captures this variation as a characteristic of the
particular judge. The scale uses the two types of requests (telephone
hearing and continuance) to best avoid correlation issues between
outcome-based motions, process-based motions, and unobservable
73.
74.

Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
See Richard H. Frankel & Alistair E. Newbern, Prisoners and Pleading,
94 WASH. U. L. REv. 899 (2017) (measuring how form complaints for federal prisoner
actions impose burdens inconsistent with governing law).
75.
This article observes the characteristic of access-friendliness, but does not
have the data to analyze why a particular judge is access-friendly. This is plainly an
area for future research.
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characteristics of a case or party and to account for sample size
constraints.7 The scale is fairly reliable with an alpha score of .45. A
similar scale captures party-specific access-friendliness, that is, a
judge's likelihood of granting a particular party type's pre-hearing
telephone or continuance request. This scale is also reliable with an
alpha score of .65.
Returning to the hypothesis, if access-friendliness is a meaningful
judicial phenomenon, the expectation is that this variation matters in
some way. The scale forms the basis for a model that investigates the
relationship between access-friendliness as an independent variable and
case outcomes as a dependent variable. The model uses logistic
regression and controls for the presence of representation and the
party's status as appellant. The findings below report odds ratios for
ease of interpretation.
This study is observational in nature. It does not use randomized
design due to the nature of the data and the ethical challenges of
randomizing cases and their characteristics. It is careful not to call
results "causal" and instead demonstrates correlative relationships. This
design acknowledges the unknown selection bias that may occur in a
party's choice to appeal an unemployment insurance case or seek and
obtain representation. The analysis is nonetheless useful because it is a
very large, population-sized collection of data (every unemployment
case in the District of Columbia over a two-and-a-half-year period
where the worker's separation from employment is at issue) that
provides insight into a breadth of issues of concern. This type of
observational study provides useful analysis that a randomized study,
necessarily focused on narrow variables, cannot. It is also worth noting
that the analysis in this particular article is primarily concerned with
judges and not the relative experiences of represented parties as
compared to unrepresented parties. To that end, representation is
captured in the descriptive statistics and functions largely as a control
variable in the analysis.
III. FINDINGS
Two main questions guide this inquiry into judges as procedural
gatekeepers to the hearing room. The first is whether some judges are
more access-friendly than others. That is, is there variation among
judges in the granting of procedural requests for a new hearing date or
76.
As a result, some motions that arguably relate to access to a courtroom
(for example, a motion for a new hearing after the scheduled hearing date) are not
included here.
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to appear by telephone? The second is, if there is a range of accessfriendliness among judges, does having an access-friendlier judge
reveal something about the rest of a litigant's case experience?
Specifically, does having a more access-friendly judge correlate with
better case outcomes for a litigant?
A. Judicial Variation in Access-Friendliness
First, the data show significant variation in how judges apply prehearing procedures. Overall, judges grant from 66% to 100% of these
pre-hearing requests: an average of 80% of telephone hearing requests
and 85% of continuance requests." Chart 1 displays this variation in
the frequency with which judges grant these requests.
CHART 1
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There is a dearth of data about how often procedural requests are
granted in any context, so it is hard to know whether this range of
variation is consistent with other jurisdictions or case types." Even in
77.
There is a low incidence of repeated requests from the same party in the
data: 13 of 419 telephone hearing requests and 51 of 660 continuance requests are
subsequent requests (by either party) in the same case.
78.
Variation in judicial decision-making has largely been measured in the
context of ultimate case outcomes. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27. One
recent study of pretrial decisions in the administrative context is similarly tied to the
underlying merits of the case, as it considers pretrial bond decisions. Emily Ryo,
Detained:A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 L. & Soc'Y REv. 117 (2016).
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the absence of comparisons, given the low levels of representation in
this data, the variation may suggest a previously unmeasured barrier for
self-represented litigants in civil access to justice. One way to describe
this variation is from the perspective of judges' roles in access to
justice: particular judges are more or less "access-friendly" in applying
the same non-merits based pre-hearing procedures in the same cases.
For litigants, this means a judge assignment represents more or less
access to the hearing room.
While there is variation among judges, it is confined to a relatively
high rate of granting these procedural requests. The context of prehearing requests generally, and this study, in particular, suggest this
variation is nonetheless meaningful. As discussed above, these cases are
ones where there is both a presumption of a worker receiving
unemployment compensation and law encouraging access to a hearing.
It is also useful to remember that these procedural requests do not
implicate-or even give judges information about-the merits of the
underlying case. Rather, the requests solely concern the reason for the
procedural request, such as conflicting medical, family, or professional
circumstances. Against this backdrop, it is notable that some judges
deny the request of one in five litigants to appear by telephone or to
change a hearing date.
As described in the methodology section, a judicial accessfriendliness scale describes a judge's propensity towards granting prehearing requests. Each judge's value on this scale captures his or her
access-friendliness, providing a tool for observing how this variation
plays out in other data about these cases. Chart 2 illustrates this scale.
CHART 2
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The scale captures only the variation in grant rates of pre-hearing
requests, and does not take into account the party requesting the
procedural motion or if they are represented.
Is this observed variation in access-friendliness just partyfriendliness? When a particular judge is more likely to grant a prehearing request, is that only because she favors letting workers (as
opposed to employers) have their day in court? This additional layer of
analysis gives insight into whether a judge's access-friendliness is about
fidelity to procedural rules, or whether it is a party-specific orientation.
The scale in Chart 3 captures the difference between judges'
amenability toward worker and employer motion requests. Positive
values of this difference scale indicate that a judge is more favorable
towards workers' requests than to employers' requests.
Chart 3 shows a different distribution among judges than the
general access-friendliness scale. A particular judge who is overall
access-friendly (grants more pre-hearing procedural requests as shown
in Chart 2) does not do so in a way that proportionally favors either the
worker or the employer (as shown in Chart 3). This suggests that the
observed access-friendliness is not masking friendliness toward one
party over another.
CHART
JUDImcIAL

PARTY-SPECIFIc

Ju

Judge 7
Judge 13

-3

-2

-1

3

AccEss FRIENDLINEss SCALE

Judge 4
12

Jud I
Judge 14

Judge 6

0

Judge 8
J dge 11

Judge 10

Judge 3

1

2

3

Employer Access-Friendly-----------Worker Access-Friendly
(Judges 5 and 9 are excluded forinsufficient a)

This variation among judges' rulings on pre-hearing requests tells
us that, even in the context of straightforward procedural requests,
judges do not apply these rules in the same way. It does not tell us what
inputs the judges are using to make these varying decisions. What we
do know is that the law as written does not make the merits or
substance of a party's case or defense relevant to these pre-hearing
requests. Nonetheless, one possibility is that some judges are importing
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the perceived merits of a case or defense into these procedural rulings.
This would be consistent with psychological research observing judges'
difficulties in disregarding inadmissible information in decisionmaking." If this is an input causing the variation in pre-hearing request
rulings, then it suggests that access-friendliness overlaps with another
characteristic: fidelity to written procedure. In this data, following the
written law of pre-hearing procedural requests and granting requests for
"good cause" means not considering the substantive merits of the case.
A finding that judges are not following this written law has implications
for state civil and administrative courts generally. This is because when
parties are unrepresented and the traditional protections of the
represented adversarial process are not available to the parties, judicial
fidelity to written procedure-that is designed to facilitate access to the
hearing room-becomes a disproportionately important procedural
protection.
Another explanation for the variation in this data is that judges are
following the law as written and have individual preferences that guide
decisions on pre-hearing requests. For example, a particular judge
dislikes telephone appearances and denies all of them, while another
judge is comfortable with telephone appearances and always grants
them. It could be that a judge has a very clear standard created from
her own experience and preferences, such as parties who are outside a
thirty-mile radius can appear by phone, and applies that standard
consistently, while another judge has no particular standard and is
internally inconsistent. This explanation for the observed variation
raises questions of how much discretion and transparency is necessary
or appropriate for these informal standards for pre-hearing procedural
requests.
B. JudicialAccess-Friendliness Is Related to Case Outcomes
Even without knowing why the observed judicial variation occurs,
we can ask what the observed access-friendliness means for the rest of
a litigant's case experience. Is this variation in access-friendliness only
a theoretical concern? The data provide an opportunity to explore this
broader question by asking whether a litigant with a more accessfriendly judge has a different case experience than one with a less
access-friendly judge. That is, regardless of whether the litigant herself
has made a pre-hearing procedural request, does a judge who is accessJeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the
79.
Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 203, 216-18
(2017) (collecting studies).
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friendly also behave in certain ways towards litigants generally? In this
data, the most straightforward way to ask this question is to see if there
is a correlation between where a judge falls on the access-friendliness
scale and a litigant's case outcome. As noted above, the main object of
this inquiry is judicial behavior and not case outcomes, and also the
data is observational and thus the analysis is not causal. Nonetheless,
investigating these correlative relationships is valuable because it helps
to develop a theoretical understanding of judicial behavior and prehearing procedures in expanding or constraining access to the hearing
room.
1. ACCESS, PARTY APPEARANCES, AND CASE OUTCOMES

This analysis begins with already-reported results from this study:
that a worker is more likely to win her case than not (in our data,
workers win 67% of cases).so As discussed elsewhere, this worker-win
rate is consistent with other studies and with the substantive legal
framework of unemployment compensation law."1 This article also
relies on earlier-reported data regarding appearances: workers appear at
66% of hearings and employers appear at 53% of hearings."
These overall case experiences change when filtered through pretrial procedural requests. As Table 4 shows, when a worker has a
continuance denied she appears at the hearing less (42% compared to
66% overall) and is less likely to win her case (52% compared to 67%
overall). In contrast, when an employer has a continuance denied, it is
more likely to appear at the hearing (58% compared to 53% overall)
and less likely to win the case (worker wins 79% compared to 67%
overall).
There appear to be different variations with telephone appearance
requests, but the lack of statistical significance for some comparisons
limits this analysis. When an employer has a telephone appearance
denied, the employer appears at the hearing more (65% compared to
53% overall) and wins more (worker wins 58% compared to 67%
overall).

80.
81.
82.

Lawyers, Power, and StrategicExpertise, supra note 3, at 482.
Id. at 481-82.
Trial and Error, supra note 6, at 1035, 1039.
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Table 4
Appearances & Outcomes When Procedural Request is Denied
(case outcomes are reported as rate at which worker wins the case)
Overall

66%

Worker
appears at
hearing
Employer
appears at
hearing
Worker

wins case

Worker
continuance

Employer
continuance

Worker
telephone

Employer
telephone

denied

denied

denied

denied

75%**

42%

67%
I

65%

58%

53%

79%

52%

38%**

58%

I

**Insufficient sample size to be significant
The differences in appearances and case outcomes after
procedural requests may be the result of the different nature of
representation for workers and employers in these cases. Only 19% of
workers are represented in these cases and these workers are largely
those in hourly-wage jobs. Thus it may be that when a worker requests
a continuance, it is because she has an inflexible conflict-such as a
new job without time off that she does not want to lose. Thus, without a
continuance, she is likely to forego unemployment compensation and
keep her new job.83 In contrast, employers are represented in 42% of
cases in this data, largely by the same small collection of attorney and
lay representatives.' Because there is a significant presence of
sophisticated representatives, and because these representatives often
have scheduling conflicts among cases, it may be that an employer's
continuance request reflects greater flexibility than a worker's and,
when a continuance is denied, an alternate representative or witness is
obtained and the parties appear at the hearing in greater numbers.
Large employers in this jurisdiction are also repeat players in these
cases and they may have a clearer understanding that a failure to appear
at a hearing, even when a continuance is denied, means losing the
If a worker gets a new job she can only claim unemployment
83.
compensation for the period of time she was unemployed, but because of the lengthy
claims and appeals process, workers often have hearings at OAH-concerning whether
they will receive unemployment compensation for interim weeks or months of
unemployment-long after they have obtained new employment. These are vital
economic benefits for many workers who are behind on rent or otherwise foregone
expenses while unemployed and so they still pursue them despite having found new
employment.
Trial and Error,supra note 6, at 1032.
84.
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case.15 In addition, the fact of seeking a continuance may spur an
employer to focus on preparing a case earlier, leading to a more
informed choice about contesting the case, and thus a greater inclination
to appear at the hearing."
The decreased win rates for employers whose continuances are
denied may reflect a combination of the substantive legal burdens in
these cases and additional notice to workers. If an employer does not
appear at a hearing and a worker does, the worker automatically wins
the case due to the employer having the burden of proof. If the denial
of a continuance means the employer is less likely to attend the hearing,
this would increase the likelihood of the worker winning the case. In
addition, when an employer has a continuance denied, this triggers at
least two additional notices (service of the request and the order
denying the request) to the worker. This additional notice may increase
the likelihood the worker attends the hearing, due to additional notice
and due to the impression that the employer may not attend.
Though the data is not sufficient to draw meaningful conclusions
about workers' telephone requests, employers' telephone requests are
more consistent with a straightforward explanation of the behavior of
the more powerful, more represented party in the face of denied
requests." Table 4 shows that employers whose telephone appearance
requests are denied are more likely to appear at the hearing than
employers overall. The fact of a telephone appearance request from an
employer suggests that the employer has a witness whose testimony it
wants to present. Thus the increased appearance rate is consistent with
the explanation that these cases are ones where the party or its
representative has invested some time in understanding the case, which
either reflects a choice to contest the case or leads to such a choice
because solid evidence is located. As Table 4 shows, employers are
also more likely to win these cases. This is what we would expecthaving made an informed investment in the case, located evidence, and
appeared at the hearing, employers win more.
2.

ACCESS-FRIENDLINESS AND CASE OUTCOMES

The data about party appearances and case outcomes are the
backdrop for the second part of the inquiry about judicial access85.
Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 491.
86.
See generally id.
87.
See, e.g., Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 491
(discussing theories of how powerful parties develop and exercise expertise in
navigating procedures).
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friendliness: what difference does this judicial characteristic make in a
party's overall case experience? This next part of the analysis is
constructed to ask whether the likelihood of a worker winning is
positively related to a higher placement on the pre-hearing accessfriendliness scale (i.e. a judge who more frequently grants requests for
a new hearing date or telephone appearance). Though this model asks
whether a worker wins, this of course inversely relates to whether an
employer wins. As Table 5 reflects, the model controls for the presence
of worker representation and the worker's status as the appellant in the
case.
Table 5 reports the outcomes of logistic regression and reports
odds ratios for ease of interpretation. An odds ratio of less than 1.0
indicates that the variable is negatively related to worker win rates-the
odds of a worker winning when those conditions are present are lower
than if those conditions are not present. Alternatively, an odds ratio
greater than 1.0 indicates that the presence of a particular variable
increases the odds of a worker winning her case.
TABLE 5
WINNING CASE
WORKER
OF
LIKELIHOOD
& ACCESS-FRIENDLY JUDGE

Odds Ratio (std. error)
1.12 (.045)

More Access-Friendly Judge
Worker has representation

2.83 (.241)

&

More Access-Friendly Judge (higher
score on scale)

&

More Access-Friendly Judge
Worker is appellant
2

Wald Chi
Pseudo R 2
N

.546 (.037)
218.1
0.04
5086

This analysis shows that a worker with a judge who is more
access-friendly is more likely to ultimately win her case (an odds ratio
of 1.12 indicates that the presence of a more access-friendly judge
increases the odds of a worker winning her case). The data also show
that this increased likelihood of the worker winning her case is not the
judge's predisposition towards workers. This is both because, as
discussed above, the pre-hearing access-friendliness scale is not a proxy
for party preference and because using the same model as Table 5 with
the party-specific access friendliness scale shows a weaker relationship
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between party-specific access friendliness and the likelihood of the
worker winning her case."
Table 5 also shows that representation for a worker increases the
likelihood that a worker with an access-friendly judge will win her case
(an odds ratio of 2.83 indicates that the presence of an access-friendlier
judge and representation for the worker increases the odds-even
more-that the worker will win her case). This is consistent with
previously reported results about the role of representation in this
data. 89 Interestingly, Table 5 also shows that a worker who is the
appellant is less likely to win her case with a pre-hearing accessfriendly judge (an odds ratio of .546 indicates that the presence of a
more access-friendly judge and the worker as appellate decreases the
odds that the worker will win her case). This is also consistent with
previously reported results about overall case outcomes for appellant
parties.'
What do these results mean for pre-hearing procedural requests
and judges? The data tell us a worker with an access-friendly judge is
more likely to get in the hearing room, more likely to win her case and
receive unemployment compensation, and thus more likely to
experience the benefits that flow from that.91 The model also tells us
that these advantages for workers are not party-related bias on the part
of particular judges. To the contrary, this data may be showing relative
fidelity to the law as written. This may be fidelity to written procedure
that favors litigants getting in the hearing room or it may be fidelity to
written substantive law that favors workers receiving unemployment
compensation. It may also be fidelity to informal standards developed
by the particular judge.

88.
The odds ratio for a more party-specific-access friendly judge and a
worker winning her case is 1.04 (.027).
89.
Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3 (finding that
representation for workers increases the likelihood of the worker winning the case, and
that representation for employer decreases the likelihood of the worker winning the
case).
90.
See id. (finding that worker as appellant decreases likelihood of worker
winning the case).
91.
See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C.
SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 22 (2011), [https://perma.cc/BUT7-MHM5]

(calculating that 3.2 million people would have fallen below poverty line in 2010
without unemployment insurance benefits); Jonathan Cylus & Mauricio Avendano,
Receiving Unemployment Benefits May Have Positive Effects on the Health of the
Unemployed, 36 HEALTH AFF. 289 (2017) (discussing the "health-promoting effects"
that come with receiving unemployment benefits).
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Table 5 also reflects, like previous articles about this data and the
work of others, that representation magnifies all of these advantages in
the civil justice process.' At its simplest, it may be that this aspect of
the data is showing that access-friendly judges are operating within the
system as the written law intends, and representation for a worker
ensures that this is happening consistently." In a system where parties
are all represented, representation is a way of monitoring and
challenging judges who are less friendly toward procedural requests
provided for by law or-viewed more broadly-who are not applying
the law appropriately to the facts.' A related insight from the data is
that if there is no representation-as is the case for at least one party in
the large majority of cases in this study-the interaction of judges and
written law may produce different kinds of judicial behavior. This
variation, and a greater understanding of the reasons for it, is a
valuable focus for future research.
The finding that a worker who is the appellant is less likely to win
her case with a pre-hearing access-friendly judge may reveal an
additional nuance to this concept of fidelity to procedures and accessfriendliness. It may be that there is a fairness concept embedded in
access-friendliness that is rooted in written procedure (or at least
general procedural norms). It may be that judges believe that the party
who "started" a case should meet a higher standard to delay a case
because it is unfair to drag another party into court and then make them
wait to resolve the case. This is not necessarily an inappropriate
perspective, but it should be a transparent and consistent one, rather
than a matter of personal judicial approach or behavior.
It may also be that the data reveal a gap in fidelity to the law,
driven perhaps by human nature and perceptions of the adversarial
system. While the written law does not give a "loss" in the agency
proceeding any meaning or weight in the cases in this data, it may be
that a judge is implicitly incorporating this information into decisions.9
The data may be capturing a judge who sees an agency claims

Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3.
Rebecca L. Sandefur, When is Law in Action?, 77 OHIO ST. L.J.
FURTHERMORE 59, 62-64 (2016), [https://perma.cc/4CJN-99M4].
94.
In an earlier article, my co-authors and I address a variation on this point:
the absence of law reform arising from cases where parties are unrepresented because
lawyers challenge the system in ways that self-represented parties, lay representatives,
or lawyers providing less than full representation are not equipped to. Can a Little
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, supra note 7.
This would be consistent with other studies of judicial behavior. See
95.
Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 79, at 205, 216-18 (collecting studies regarding
judicial consideration of inadmissible evidence).
92.
93.
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determination and does not formally receive it as evidence in a case, yet
it informs the judge's intermediate decisions-such as whether a
document or witness is relevant-and the ultimate decision. In either
circumstance, this finding about workers as appellants has particular
salience for self-represented parties as both the concept of fairness and
the implicit incorporation of agency determinations rest on assumptions
that are far harder to see or overcome without representation.
C.

Implications

The implications for this analysis rest on two premises that are
unlikely to change: (1) the hearing room will remain the centerpiece of
state civil and administrative courts and (2) parties in these courts will
be overwhelmingly unrepresented. If these premises hold, then the
analysis in this article suggests that we should invest in clarifying how
we value access to the hearing room, and how we establish and make
transparent written law and judicial behavior to implement that value.
There has been plenty of focus on judicial behavior including
judicial training, rules of judicial conduct, and judicial selection
processes. The American Bar Association and many states have
implemented judicial ethical reform focused on helping self-represented
parties. As discussed above, the District of Columbia, the site of the
data for this study, implemented among the most aggressive reforms in
the country right before the data collection for this study. The
qualitative research from this study-conducted two years after these
reforms-suggests that judges were universally aware of their role as
facilitators of access to justice, and yet varied widely in how they
played this role in the hearing room. Despite these reforms, this
article reveals similar variation in pre-hearing access-friendliness. Some
scholars have suggested a more formalistic approach that shifts
responsibility to the courts for procedural compliance.' But do judges
enforcing judges simply exacerbate the challenge? Again, the
qualitative data from the larger study, of which this is a part, suggests
that in the hearing room this approach yields inconsistent results."
A threshold question is: whether we value access to the hearing
room enough to clarify and enforce that value in written law? Are there
some parts of our written law where we do not need judicial discretion
because we are clear about the value of access to the hearing room?
96.
Active Judging andAccess to Justice, supra note 26, at 655-56.
97.
Steinberg, supra note 8, at 795.
98.
Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 26, at 656 (reporting
inconsistency in hearing behaviors at OAH despite mandated peer review system).
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The narrowest way to answer these questions in the affirmative is
"automatic" access to a hearing. For example, court rules could
provide that every litigant, regardless of the reason for the request,
receives one automatic hearing continuance or telephone hearing. Or
rules like the "good cause" standard in the data in this article could
become more specific requirements, such as granting a new hearing
date for a fever, but not for a routine dental cleaning. Some courts have
versions of such rules already, with varying degrees of formality. We
should study these formal and informal rules more. There are
undoubtedly costs associated with docket management and court
resources, as well as timeliness of decisions. But in some cases and
courts-including the one that is the site of this study-those might be
acceptable burdens in the pursuit of access to justice in a civil or
administrative court system that is no longer a represented, adversarial
process.'

There are also broader implications to these findings. First, should
we be considering this relationship between the value of access, prehearing procedures, and judicial implementation in a systematic way?
What if a state or local court undertook a comprehensive review of its
pre-hearing procedures, identified where access to the hearing room is
a key value, identified which procedures ostensibly exist to create
access, and asked whether these laws could be rewritten to pursue this
value more explicitly and directly, even if that meant reducing judicial
discretion? Such an effort might yield unexpected results in terms of
litigant satisfaction, use of court resources, and efficient system
function.
In an even broader sense, the findings in this article inform more
ambitious redesign of justice systems. There are active movementsarising largely out of technological advancements-to reconceive of
justice systems.'"0 For example, technology developed by Modria,
originally developed for Ebay's lauded online dispute resolution
system, was used to adjudicate divorces in the Netherlands and is now
being redeveloped into a new form.'o The system gathers information
from both parties and then recommends options for both representation
and judge-based adjudication depending on the circumstances of the

This echoes a call in a different context for making the rules match the
99.
reality of pretrial circumstances. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil
Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1713 (2012).
100. See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 18.
101. The tool can be found at Rechtwijzer.nl. See Roger Smith, Goodbye,
Rechtwijzer: Hello, Justice42, LAW, TECH. & AccEss TO JUST. (Mar. 31, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/DHJ8-J26E].
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case." Essentially, the system has automated the access choices in the
judicial system without explicitly constraining access. Of course, this
brave new world of automating court processes implicates weighty
questions balancing of certainty, efficiency, and individual justice that
are beyond the scope of this article. Yet the findings of this article
suggest that technological redesign and judicial reform efforts may
come from different intellectual sources, but they end up asking the
same question: are we implementing state civil and administrative
justice systems consistent with how we value access to a substantive
determination? The implication of this study that some access-focused
procedures may be better suited to clearer standards, or even automatic
and not judicially implemented decisions, informs these technological
efforts.
CONCLUSION

This article examines the question of how judges apply pre-hearing
procedures that control access to the hearing room. The data show
significant variation in how judges apply the same procedure in the
same types of cases, and that this variation is not explained by party
bias or representation. This variation in judicial application of
straightforward procedure outside the courtroom suggests that we need
to know more about the role of pre-trial procedures in access to justice
for self-represented litigants in state civil and administrative courts.
This suggestion is compounded by the analysis-not demonstrating a
causal relationship, but nonetheless underscoring the importance of
getting in the courtroom-that a worker who gets a judge who is more
likely to let her in the courtroom is more likely to win her case.
These findings emphasize the importance of procedures and
judicial decisions that grant or deny access to the courtroom for selfrepresented litigants. They also underscore that changes to judicial
behavior-through suggestion, training, or ethical codes-are likely
insufficient to achieve access to justice in state civil and administrative
courts. Though it may be in tension with the individualized decision
making that comes from judicial discretion, access to justice reform in
state civil and administrative courts may necessarily require a new
approach to legal standards, procedures, and systems that more closely
hew to the value of access to justice for self-represented litigants.

102.

See id.
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